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Abstract
	 To	date	a	dearth	of	data	has	made	it	difficult	to	evaluate	the	success	of	First	
Nations	casinos	in	Canada.	This	paper	helps	remedy	this	situation	by	presenting	a	
three-province	overview	(Ontario,	Saskatchewan	and	Alberta)	of	First	Nations	gaming	
models.	Two	key	findings	are	offered	that	First	Nations	seeking	gaming	market	entry	and	
provincial	officials	should	genuinely	consider.	First,	while	each	province	has	adopted	a	
unique	approach	to	First	Nations	gaming	policy	they	have	each	opted	to	direct	substantial	
revenues	out	of	First	Nations	communities	and	into	their	own	treasuries.	Second,	the	
evidence	suggests	that	larger	gaming	properties	located	nearby	a	significant	market	
provide	more	benefits	versus	smaller	properties	situated	in	more	isolated	areas.	The	
subsequent	discussion	elaborates	each	provincial	model’s	revenue	generating	power,	
how	the	revenue	in	question	is	being	allocated	and	its	corresponding	socio-economic	
impact,	whether	increased	problem	gambling	and	crime	have	resulted	as	predicted,	while	
exploring	employment	trends	to	determine	whether	they	have	developed	as	anticipated.	
Introduction
	 Evaluating	the	impact	of	First	Nations	casinos	in	Canada	has	been	hampered	
by	a	lack	of	data	(cf	Cornell,	2008).2	First	Nations	leaders	in	several	provinces	are	
nevertheless	considering	investing	in	reserve	casino	expansion.	There	are	currently	17	
First	Nations	casinos	operating	nationally	in	B.C.	(1),	Alberta	(5),	Saskatchewan	(6),	
Manitoba	(2)	and	Ontario	(1	for	profit;	2	charity).	Initially	touted	as	revenue	generators	
that	would	employ	large	numbers	of	Aboriginal	employees	thus	increasing	community	
benefits,	provincial	premiers	in	Ontario,	Saskatchewan	and	Alberta	echoed	the	First	
Nation	leadership’s	positive	testimonials	to	likewise	champion	reserve	casino	expansion	
as	a	means	of	improving	local	First	Nations	development	potential	and	well-being.	
Each	provincial	government	chose,	however,	to	execute	policies	prescribing	revenue	
1	 	Yale	D.	Belanger	(Ph.D.)	is	an	associate	professor	of	Political	Science;	and	adjunct	associate	professor,	Faculty	of	Health	
Sciences,	University	of	Lethbridge.	He	would	like	to	thank	Rob	Williams,	Jennifer	Arthur,	and	Shannon	Phillips	for	their	
insightful	responses	to	several	questions;	and	the	two	anonymous	reviewers	for	their	perceptive	comments,	all	of	which	
helped	to	strengthen	this	article.	Any	errors	in	fact	and/or	interpretation	are	the	sole	responsibility	of	the	author.	Portions	
of	this	paper	were	presented	at	the	annual	National	Association	for	Gambling	Studies	Conference	(Australia,	2010)	and	
at	the	Alberta	Gaming	Research	Institute,	Banff	Conference	on	Internet	Gambling	(2011).	The	author	would	like	to	thank	
the	panel	moderators	and	audience	members	for	their	questions	and	comments,	which	forced	him	to	both,	reflect	on	his	
arguments	and	conclusions. 
2	 	A	First	Nation	is	a	self-governing	community	of	Aboriginal	people	living	on	a	reserve,	which	is	Crown-held	land	overseen	
by	Aboriginal	Affairs	and	Northern	Development	Canada	(AANDC),	the	federal	“Indian”	bureaucracy	that	operates	out	of	
Ottawa.	“Aboriginal	people”	is	a	Constitutionally-entrenched	phrase	describing	Canada’s	Indian,	Inuit,	and	Métis	peoples.	
The	term	“Indian”	is	used	in	legislation	or	policy;	it	also	appears	in	discussions	concerning	such	legislation	or	policy,	as	will	
proper	names	of	communities	used	historically	and	today.
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distribution	formulas,	restrictions	on	casino	site	construction,	while	most	importantly	
directing	casino	revenues	purportedly	earmarked	for	First	Nations	communities	into	
provincial	treasuries.	Despite	these	setbacks,	First	Nations	leaders	in	each	province	
remain	confident	in	the	reserve	casino’s	potential.	Aside	from	assenting,	anecdotal	
declarations,	modest	efforts	have	been	directed	at	exploring	each	model’s	exigencies	
in	comparative	perspective.	This	paper	represents	the	first	multi-province	evaluation	of	
First	Nations	casinos	in	Canada	and	assesses	the	Ontario,	Saskatchewan,	and	Alberta	
First	Nations	gaming	models	to	determine	whether	First	Nations	casinos	are	providing	
maximum	benefits.3	In	particular,	the	following	discussion	evaluates	the	three	provincial	
gaming	models’	revenue	generating	power,	how	the	revenue	is	being	allocated	and	its	
corresponding	socio-economic	impact,	whether	increased	problem	gambling	and	crime	
have	resulted	as	projected,	while	exploring	employment	trends	to	determine	their	impact.	
This	paper	unfolds	as	follows.	After	a	literature	review	an	overview	of	each	provincial	
First	Nations	gaming	policy	is	provided	followed	by	a	quantitative	analysis	exploring	the	
aforementioned	subjects,	and	the	conclusions.
Literature Review
United	States	Indian	nations	started	utilizing	reservation	casinos	as	an	economic	
stimulus	in	the	1980s.	Described	as	“islands	of	poverty	in	a	sea	of	wealth”	(Anderson	
&	Parker,	2008,	p.	641),	as	one	researcher	has	noted,	reservation	communities	“[w]ith	
little	or	no	economy	or	tax	base	to	fund	essential	services	…	turned	to	gaming,	through	
self-determination,	to	generate	government	revenue	needed	to	fund	these	services	and	
provide	employment	for	tribal	members”	(Schaap,	2010,	p.	381).	By	2002,	over	half	of	
all	tribal	members	living	in	the	contiguous	48	states	belonged	to	casino-operating	tribes	
(Evans	&	Topoleski,	2003)	and,	in	2008,	Indian	gaming	revenues	topped	$26.7	billion	
with	233	Indian	tribes	operating	411	casinos,	bingo	halls,	and	pull-tab	operations	in	28	
states	(NIGA,	2009).	Dating	to	1996,	Canada’s	First	Nations’	gaming	industry	is	by	
comparison	diminutive	in	scope,	with	15	for	profit	and	two	charitable	casinos	operating	
nationally	that	generate	an	estimated	$1	billion	annual	gross	revenues.	Accordingly,	
a	large	proportion	of	the	research	literature	on	casino	gambling	concerns	its	effect	on	
US	reservations	(Williams,	Belanger,	&	Arthur,	2011).	Recent	studies	have,	however,	
improved	our	collective	understanding	of	these	Canadian	phenomena	(Belanger,	2006,	
2011b;	Manitowabi,	2007;	Williams,	Belanger,	et	al.,	2011).	Even	so,	it	is	difficult	to	
generalize	about	gambling’s	inter-jurisdictional	impacts	for	they	vary	as	a	function	of	
pre-existing	availability	and	exposure	to	gambling,	the	gamblers’	patronage	origin,	how	
gambling	revenue	is	distributed,	and	baseline	levels	of	community	impoverishment	
(Williams,	Rehm,	&	Stevens	2011).	Therefore,	evaluating	the	US	Indian	gaming	industry	
in	part	offers	a	comparative	context	and	the	baseline	for	further	analyses.	
Similar	to	American	Indian	gaming	research,	Canadian	First	Nations	gaming	
research	tends	to	emphasize	the	economic	and	sovereign/self-government	aspects	of	
casino	operations,	and	gambling-related	health	and	well-being	issues.	The	spotlight	
on	sovereignty	and	the	associated	economic	development	issues	is	arguably	due	to	
three	factors.	One,	American	Indian	reservations	are	Congressionally	empowered	to	
manage	internal	economic	development,	which	the	Harvard	Project	on	American	Indian	
Economic	Development	(2008)	heralds	as	a	key	foundation	of	augmented	American	
Indian	self-determination.	Two,	gaming	tribes	since	the	1980s	have	been	forced	to	
confront	State	resistance	to	negotiating	Congress-stipulated	tribal	gaming	compacts	
(Cattelino,	2008;	Fenelon,	2006;	Goldberg	&	Champagne,	2002;	Light	&	Rand,	
2005;	Rand	&	Light,	2001;	Spilde,	1998).	Third,	and	most	importantly,	First	Nations	
leaders	adopted	the	American	Indian	position	that	operating	casinos	was	a	sovereign	
right	(Belanger,	2006;	Belanger	&	Williams,	2012b;	Lazarus,	Monzon,	&	Wodnicki,	
2006).	American	Indian	and	First	Nations	gaming	is	therefore	heralded	as	a	beacon	of	
3	 	The	casino	operations	in	B.C.	and	Manitoba	were	left	out	of	this	analysis	due	to	their	small	size	and	because	the	data	sets	
generated	remain	at	this	stage	incomplete.	Nova	Scotia	was	left	out	due	to	the	fact	that	no	stand	alone	casinos	are	operation.	
Rather,	the	First	Nations	manage	and	operate	582	VLTs	at	a	variety	of	provincial	sites	dubiously	identified	‘VLT	Palaces’.	
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Indian	sovereignty	(Gaughen,	2011;	Hansen	&	Skopek,	2011),	whereas	Congressional	
demands	for	state-American	Indian	compacts	are	criticized	as	an	intolerable	imposition	
compromising	American	Indians’	inherent	sovereignty	(Ackerman,	2009;	Light	&	Rand,	
2005;	Mezey,	1996;	Schaap,	2010;	Skopek	&	Hansen,	2011).	Perhaps	as	troubling	is	
the	fact	that	gaming	tribes	have	little	to	no	recourse	in	instances	where	states	desire	to	
renegotiate	the	compacts	(Light	&	Rand,	2005)	(Rand	2007;	Rausch	2007);	or	when	
the	provinces	refuse	First	Nations	a	substantial	consultative	role	during	gaming	policy	
development	(Belanger	&	Williams,	2012b).	
That	we	remain	largely	uninformed	about	how	provincial	gaming	policies	impact	
First	Nations	communities	and	their	host	provinces	is	problematic	for	these	policies	do	
notably	guide	casino	operations,	highlighting	the	direct	provincial	influence	upon	First	
Nations	economic	development	(Belanger,	Williams,	&	Arthur,	2012a;	Nilson,	2004;	
Williams,	Belanger,	et	al.,	2011).	In	addition	to	undermining	indigenous	sovereignty	
by	allowing	the	provinces	to	legislatively	penetrate	what	were	previously	exclusively	
federal	domains,	the	provinces	hosting	First	Nations	casinos	took	questionable	
advantage	of	economically	impoverished	First	Nations’	willingness	to	accept	restrictive	
provincial	policies	in	their	zeal	to	access	gambling	revenues	(e.g.,	Belanger	&	Williams,	
2012b).	Similar	trends	are	evident	in	the	US,	where	similarly	ad-hoc	revenue	distribution	
policies	were	established	that	also	failed	to	acknowledge	vital	spatial	characteristics	
(Foley,	2005;	Light,	Rand,	&	Meister,	2004).	As	a	result,	despite	the	fact	that	hundreds	
of	tribes	operate	hundreds	of	casinos,	gambling	wealth	remains	concentrated	in	the	
hands	of	a	relatively	small	number	of	American	Indian	tribes	representing	a	minority	of	
the	overall	Indian	population	(Cornell,	2008;	Kalt,	2002).	
Kelley	(2001)	warned	Canadian	officials	of	the	inherent	risks	of	relying	on	similar	
policy	models	while	emphasizing	the	need	to	“develop	a	sound	policy	framework	that	
will	address	current	concerns	[i.e.,	revenue	distribution,	problem	gambling]	before	they	
develop	into	future	problems.”	He	added	that	policymakers	“have	an	advantage	in	that	
the	experiences	of	tribal	gambling	throughout	the	US	over	the	past	two	decades	can	act	
as	an	important	reference	for	developing	a	policy	framework	for	First	Nations	casinos.”	
It	appears	that	these	warnings	were	generally	ignored,	even	if	Canadian	provinces	
demand	as	a	condition	of	licensing	revenue	sharing	amongst	gaming	and	non-gaming	
First	Nations	as	a	means	of	ensuring	most	First	Nations	have	access	to	a	portion	of	the	
revenues	(Belanger,	2006).	Less	encouraging	are	provincial	and	state	demands	that	
First	Nations	transfer	a	percentage	of	their	gaming	revenues	into	state	and	provincial	
treasuries	(Belanger	&	Williams,	2012b;	Rand	&	Light,	2006).	
Despite	these	and	similar	policy	failings,	it	is	evident	that	casino-related	economic	
benefits	have	not	evaded	all	First	Nations	and	reservations.	Several	studies	point	to	
casino-related	increased	infrastructure	values	(Anders,	1996;	Farrigan,	2005;	Ha	&	
Ullmer,	2007;	Snyder,	1999;	J.	B.	Taylor	&	Kalt,	2005);	and	benefits	for	other	non-
gambling	businesses	and	state	economies	(Andrews,	2007;	Evans	&	Topoleski,	2003;	
W.	S.	Taylor,	2001).	However,	the	economic	boon	anticipated	by	the	majority	of	First	
Nations	and	American	Indian	communities	hosting	casinos	has	failed	to	materialize	
(Belanger,	2011b;	Kayseas,	Schneider,	&	Goodpipe,	2010).	In	instances	where	revenue	
distribution	models	are	in	place,	the	majority	of	communities	hosting	casinos	have	
also	been	shown	to	profit	disproportionately	over	non-host	communities	(Belanger	&	
Williams,	2012a;	Cornell,	2008;	J.	B.	Taylor	&	Kalt,	2005).	For	example,	substantial	
improvements	have	been	identified	in	Arizona	and	New	Mexico’s	gaming	reservations	
compared	to	non-gaming	communities	(Gonzales,	Lyson,	&	Mauser,	2007;	Jojola	&	
Ong,	2006).	Notable	unemployment	reductions	in	host	reservations	have	been	noted	
(Murray	1993;	Cozzetto	1995;	Cornell	et	al.	1998)	as	have	noteworthy	employment	and	
income	gains	(Anders,	1996;	Conner	&	Taggert,	2009;	Cozzetto,	1995;	d’Hauteserre,	
1998;	Evans	&	Topoleski,	2003;	Fenelon,	2006;	Gonzales,	2003;	Kim,	2006;	Ninokawa,	
2002;	Reagan	&	Gitter,	2007;	Spilde,	Taylor,	&	Grant,	2003;	Topoleski,	2003;	Wenz,	
2006).	Evident	revenue	distribution	disparities	resulting	from	poorly-constructed	
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provincial	and	state	gaming	policies	that	tend	to	undermine	indigenous	sovereignty	
and	development	opportunities	have	not	stopped	several	scholars	from	concluding	that	
American	Indian	and	First	Nations	gaming’s	positives	at	this	stage	outweigh	the	negatives	
(Cornell,	2008;	Schaap,	2010;	Williams,	Belanger,	et	al.,	2011).	This	by	and	large	echoes	
Thompson’s	(1994)	enthusiastic	declaration	about	the	Indian	casino	industry’s	promise	
for	both	the	US	and	Canada	(see	also	Chenault,	2000):
 
Indian	gaming	is	the	future	for	Native	tribes’	survival	and	liberation	from	
the	federal	governments	of	the	United	States	and	Canada.	Without	this	liberation	
and	autonomy,	tribal	sovereignty	will	never	become	a	reality	and	North	
American	Indians	will	remain	trapped	in	a	cycle	of	poverty	and	despair	due	to	
the	lack	of	financial	support	necessary	to	educate,	rehabilitate,	and	stimulate	
growth	in	Indian	Country.	(Thompson,	1994,	pp.	533-534)
As	Cornell	(2008,	64)	laments,	however,	“it	is	difficult	to	know,	comprehensively	
and	in	detail,	how	much	money	Indian	nations	are	making	from	gaming,	what	exactly	
they	are	doing	with	the	money	they	make,	or	what	its	social	and	economic	impacts	
are.”	For	example,	US	Indian	casinos	located	next	to	large	cities	are	economically	quite	
successful,	whereas	the	geographically	removed	enterprises	typically	realize	modest	
returns,	trends	that	are	becoming	more	evident	in	Canada	(Belanger,	2006).	One	needs	
to	question	why	state	and	provincial	governments	have	developed	policies	that	fail	to	
consider	these	and	similar	geographic	disparities	(Belanger,	Williams	&	Arthur,	2012b).	
The	following	analysis	of	the	three	provincial	First	Nations	casino	models—Ontario,	
Saskatchewan	and	Alberta—speaks	to	several	of	these	issues;	shows	us	how	much	
revenue	is	being	generated	and	thus	directed	to	First	Nations;	while	helping	us	to	better	
comprehend	how	a	policy	enacted	for	the	benefit	of	First	Nations	in	three	provinces	
operates,	and	the	political	response	(or	lack	thereof)	to	unanticipated	challenges.
First Nation’s gaming expansion in ON, SK & AB
State-sanctioned	gaming	on	a	reserve	is	deemed	acceptable,	but	to	operate	outside	of	
legislative	strictures	is	to	defy	provincial	jurisdiction	and	risk	Criminal Code of Canada 
charges.	This	has	not	stopped	First	Nations	leaders	from	contending	that	reserve	gaming	
operations	are	shielded	from	provincial	laws	by	virtue	of	Section	91(24)	of	the	British 
North America Act	of	1867,	which	recognizes	Canada’s	sole	responsibility	for	“Indians,	
and	Lands	reserved	for	the	Indians.”	Asked	to	resolve	this	question,	the	Supreme	Court	
of	Canada	in	R. v. Pamajewon	in	1996	determined	that	the	Shawanaga	and	Eagle	Lake	
First	Nations	in	Ontario	did	not	possess	an	Aboriginal	right	to	control	and	regulate	
casino	gaming	in	their	reserve	communities.	The	Court	determined	that	the	litigants	
failed	to	demonstrate	gaming’s	centrality	to	Ojibwa	culture	or	its	practice	as	connected	
to	“the	self-identity	and	self-preservation	of	the	aboriginal	societies	involved	here”	(R. 
v. Pamajewon,	1996).	Concluding	that	gaming	was	not	an	Aboriginal	right,	the	Supreme	
Court	determined	that	on-reserve	gambling	facilities	were	not	exempt	from	provincial	
legislation	regulating	gaming.	As	a	result	each	province	may	devise	its	own	regulatory	
framework	for	First	Nations	casinos.	In	turn	sui generis	policy	environments	and	on	
the	ground	gambling	industries	have	emerged	that	demonstrate	unique	similarities	and	
differences.	The	following	discussion	elaborates	these	similarities	and	differences	while	
establishing	the	key	policy	markers	guiding	the	evolution	of	First	Nations	gaming	in	each	
province.	
Ontario
In	1992,	in	response	to	discussion	with	Ontario	First	Nations	leaders,	Premier	Bob	
Rae	(NDP)	announced	his	intention	to	open	a	reserve	casino.	By	February	1994,	fourteen	
provincial	First	Nations	had	their	sights	set	on	hosting	the	casino	that	would,	according	
to	provincial	officials,	distribute	profits	to	the	province’s	First	Nations	through	a	First	
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Nations	fund.	On	5	December	1994,	Premier	Rae	announced	that	the	Mnjikaning	First	
Nation	had	been	selected	as	the	site.	CasinoRama	would	be	situated	on	First	Nations	
land—the	Mnjikaning	reserve—and	would	be	run	by	an	established	corporation	during	
its	first	ten	years	of	operations.	A	request	for	proposals	stipulated	that	the	operator’s	
costs	prior	to	construction	would	include	the	construction	of	a	recreational	facility,	a	
senior’s	home,	and	the	establishment	of	a	trust	fund	to	develop	a	gambling	addictions	
program.	The	Mnjikaning	proposal	was	considered	the	most	attractive	for	a	number	of	
reasons,	the	most	important	being	the	revenue-sharing	formula,	which	would	see	65%	
of	net	revenues	divided	among	the	province’s	133	First	Nations.	The	remaining	35%	
would	stay	with	the	Mnjikaning	First	Nation	to	deal	with	increased	traffic’s	impact	on	
reserve	infrastructure	and	to	ensure	programs	for	problem	gaming	in	the	community	
were	funded.	Following	the	announced	opening	date,	the	Progressive	Conservatives	
(PC)	defeated	the	NDP	and	immediately	imposed	a	20%	Win	Tax	on	Casino	Rama	
gross	revenues.	
Saskatchewan
In	1993,	the	Federation	of	Saskatchewan	Indian	Nations	(FSIN),	the	provincial	
Indian	political	representative	body,	approached	Premier	Roy	Romanow	(NDP)	
to	discuss	reserve	casino	construction.	From	the	premier’s	perspective,	the	FSIN’s	
inability	to	speak	on	behalf	of	the	majority	of	the	province’s	First	Nations,	tribal	
councils,	and	individual	band	councils	rendered	the	organization	less	than	effective.	
Negotiations,	nevertheless,	proceeded	and	in	1995	the	Gaming	Framework	Agreement	
(GFA)	and	the	Casino	Operating	Agreement	(COA)	were	implemented.	The	
Saskatchewan	Indian	Gaming	Authority	(SIGA)	was	established	as	a	First	Nation-
operated	oversight	agent.	At	the	GFA’s	center	was	the	revenue-sharing	formula,	
including	a	set	of	guidelines	delineating	how	the	revenues	were	to	be	spent	by	recipient	
First	Nations.	Specifically,	the	provincial	government	would	receive	37.5%	of	net	
revenues,	37.5%	would	go	to	the	First	Nations	Trust	for	community	distribution	in	the	
form	of	social	programs,	economic	development	and	infrastructure	development	and	
upgrades,	whereas	the	residual	25%	would	be	allocated	to	four	provincial	Community	
Development	Corporations	(CDC).	Each	CDC	was	created	to	aid	in	distributing	
one-quarter	of	the	net	profit	share	pursuant	to	the	Framework	Agreement	in	an	effort	
to:	(1)	stimulate	First	Nations	economic	development;	(2)	fund	reserve	justice	and	
health	initiatives;	(3)	finance	reserve	education	and	cultural	development;	(4)	improve	
community	infrastructure;	and	(5)	develop	senior	and	youth	programs	and	other	
charitable	purposes.	Each	CDC	was	recognized	as	a	corporate	body	with	a	board	of	
directors	(Nilson,	2004).	The	Saskatchewan	government,	in	2007,	lowered	its	share	
of	First	Nations	gaming	revenues	from	37.5%	to	25%	while	raising	the	overall	First	
Nations	share	of	profits	to	75%.	The	revised	revenue	sharing	agreement	has	led	to	
improved	First	Nations	development,	which	is	directly	attributable	to	an	infusion	of	
gaming	revenues.	As	of	2013-2014,	SIGA	is	successfully	operating	six	casinos.
Alberta
In	1993,	the	Tsuu	T’ina	First	Nation	(southwest	of	Calgary)	and	the	Enoch	Cree	
First	Nation	(west	of	Edmonton)	were	awarded	licenses	to	hold	super-bingos	that	
guaranteed	jackpots	exceeding	$10,000.	That	year,	the	Tsuu	T’ina	turned	a	$100,000	
profit,	which	led	to	immediate	calls	from	provincial	First	Nations	leaders	to	create	
an	independent	First	Nations	Gaming	Commission	(Stewart	1993).	First	Nations	
leaders	advocated	for	a	policy	model	ensuring	all	bands	would	benefit	equally	from	
any	reserve	casino	developments.	As	early	as	1996,	a	plan	was	tabled	that	would	have	
allocated	10%	of	First	Nation	casino	profits	to	a	fund	benefitting	the	province’s	First	
Nations,	while	the	First	Nation,	or	the	management	company	running	the	casino,	
would	receive	50%	of	the	profits.	Alberta’s	licensed	charities	would	receive	the	
remaining	40%	(Williams,	Belanger,	et	al.,	2011).	First	Nations	balked	at	the	proposal.	
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In	September	2000,	Premier	Ralph	Klein	(PC)	proposed	a	new	policy	that	would	allocate	
all	reserve	casino	profits	to	the	provincial	First	Nations	and,	in	December,	he	announced	
his	support.	First	Nations	were	pleased	and,	one	month	later,	on	January	21,	2001,	the	
FNGP	was	ratified.	It	did	contain	one	unanticipated	modification:	a	proviso	directing	
30%	of	all	First	Nations	casinos’	slot	machine	revenues	to	the	Alberta	Lottery	Fund	for	
provincial	charitable	use	(Belanger	&	Williams,	2012b).	Without	publicly	acknowledging	
the	30%	proviso’s	inclusion,	the	FNGP,	provincial	officials	claimed,	would	afford	First	
Nations	the	opportunity	“to	support	economic,	social	and	community	development	
projects	as	well	as	use	charitable	gaming	proceeds	for	initiatives	such	as	infrastructure	
and	life	skills	training”	(Belanger,	Williams,	&	Arthur,	2011).	
Table	1
Key Provisions of Each Provincial First Nations Casino Policy
Ontario Saskatchewan Alberta
Outside	Casino	Operator	
Required
* *
Revenue	Sharing	Agreement * * *
Provincial	Fee	from	Casino	
Revenues
* * *
Casinos	Licensed	as	Charities *
Provincially-prescribed	Use	of	
Casino	Revenues * * *
Problem	Gambling	Funding	
Allocated
*
Ad	hoc	approach	to	policy	
evident
* * *
In	each	case	the	provinces	leveraged	their	Criminal	Code	of	Canada-assigned	
authority	to	approve	casino	licenses	and	fashion	First	Nations	gaming	policies	reflecting	
provincial	desires.	From	a	provincial	perspective,	reserve	casinos	were	never	considered	
products	of,	nor	did	they	represent	elements	of	Aboriginal	self-government.	As	Belanger	
and	Williams	(2012)	have	argued	in	the	Alberta	context,	which	appears	to	extend	to	
Ontario	and	Saskatchewan,	each	provincial	government	has	exploited	its	Criminal	Code	
authority	by	demanding	concessions	and,	thus,	prescribing	negotiated	outcomes	much	to	
the	annoyance	of	First	Nations’	battling	for	recognition	of	what	they	argue	is	an	inherent	
Aboriginal	right	to	control	reserve	gaming	(see	also	Belanger,	2006,	2011a;	Manitowabi,	
2011).	Certain	provisions	permitted	each	province	to	dictate	through	internal	oversight	
policies	how	First	Nations	could	spend	their	revenues	as	well	as	the	guidelines	to	
releasing	the	provincially	held	casino	revenues.	Alberta	and	Ontario	demanded	outside	
casino	operators	be	brought	in	whereas	Saskatchewan	permitted	the	FSIN	to	establish	
SIGA	for	those	purposes.	As	the	above	discussion	illustrates,	despite	being	negotiated	
independently	of	one	another,	the	provincial	policies,	when	compared,	are	operationally	
similar	(see	Table	1).	The	policies	were	established	to	ensure	provincial	oversight	for	
First	Nations	casino	operations,	spending,	and	provincial	development	through	imposed	
contributions	to	provincial	coffers.	These	actions	guaranteed	that	the	provinces	retained	
centralized	authority	for	regulating	First	Nation	casino	operations	while	simultaneously	
restricting	First	Nations	economic	and	political	agency.	Each	provincial	approach	
innovatively	enabled	their	respective	gaming	bureaucracy’s	expansion	during	a	period	of	
economic	reforms	by	assigning	to	First	Nations	annual	fees	for	the	privilege	of	operating	
casinos.	
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Methodology
The	first	step	in	a	socioeconomic	impact	analysis	of	gambling	is	to	document	
how	much	money	is	actually	being	expended,	received,	and	disbursed,	as	this	serves	
as	a	rough	guide	of	the	potential	magnitude	of	these	impacts,	especially	the	economic	
ones.	This	data	was	compiled	from	the	following	sources.	For	Alberta	they	were:	
Alberta	Gaming	and	Liquor	Commission	(AGLC)	annual	reports	and	the	Alberta	
Lottery	Fund	website,	which	lists	the	details	of	all	First	Nations	Development	Fund	
(FNDF)	disbursements;	FNDF	revenues	and	their	utilization	were	obtained	from	the	
AGLC’s	public	website,	Alberta	Lottery	Fund:	Who	Benefits.	The	primary	source	
from	Ontario	was	the	Ontario	Lottery	and	Gaming	Corporation	(OLG)	annual	reports.	
For	Saskatchewan	the	annual	reports	of	the	Saskatchewan	Indian	Gaming	Authority	
(SIGA),	the	Indigenous	Gaming	Regulators	(IGR),	and	the	First	Nations	Trust	(FNT)	
were	utilized.	Where	applicable	and	verifiable	chief	and	council	members’	perspectives	
obtained	from	transmitted	and/or	printed	speeches,	interviews,	and	testimonials	and,	
where	available,	community	newsletters	are	used	to	provide	context.	First,	newspaper	
and	electronic	media	sources	(e.g.,	radio	and	television	news	reports,	YouTube)	were	
reviewed	for	relevant	information	regarding	community-based	projections	for	each	
project.	In	each	case,	multiple	newspaper	sources	were	employed	to	confirm	the	data.	
For	referencing,	the	publication	in	which	the	data	was	first	printed	was	selected.	Third,	
Indian	and	Northern	Affairs	Canada	(INAC)	data	detailing	band	council	budgets	and	
expenditures	were	utilized.	In	sum,	the	various	data	sources	provide	the	baseline	data	
needed	to	evaluate	the	respective	casinos’	impacts.	
Analysis
The	following	sections	are	distilled	from	the	data	gleaned	from	the	aforementioned	
reports	and	websites.	As	Figure	1	shows,	Ontario	appears	to	be	the	leader	both	in	terms	
of	gross	and	net	First	Nations	gaming	revenues	generated	for	the	period	2006-2010.	The	
following	sections	elaborate	on	these	trends	in	more	detail.	
Figure 1.	First	Nations	Casinos	Gross	and	Net	Revenues,	2006-2011
Gambling Revenues Generated
	 The	amount	of	revenues	generated	differ	by	province.	As	highlighted	by	Figure	
1,	between	2006-2011	CasinoRama	generated	more	than	$2.4	billion	in	gross	revenues	
followed	by	Saskatchewan	at	more	than	$1.046	billion	and	Alberta	with	more	than	
$947	million.	Alberta’s	five	casinos	were	not	fully	operational	until	2008-2009,	hence	
reviewing	the	last	three	years	is	a	better	approximation	of	First	Nations	annual	revenue	
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Table 2 
Gross Revenues, 2006-2011 
 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 Total 
Ontario $515,000,000 $499,000,000 $488,000,000 $467,500,000 $434,965,000 $2,404,465,000 
Saskatchewan $130,337,810 $190,965,435 $226,765,170 $238,746,929 $259,821,502 $1,046,636,846 
Alberta $33,745,555 $141,022,473 $253,835,015 $262,086,233 $257,050,973 $947,740,248 
 
These revenue figures are a good starting point but do not provide a definitive picture. Measuring 
the net revenues generated in each province offers a better assessment. For instance, between 
2006 and 2011 Ontario generated the highest level of net revenues followed by Alberta and 
Saskatchewan. When we factor in the anticipated annual revenue production reflective of the last 
three years of full functionality in Alberta the latter closes the gap earning $309 million 
compared to Ontario at roughly $380 million and Saskatchewan at more than $207 million.  
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1	 	The	Ontario	figures	are	based	on	figures	reported	by	the	Canadian	Press	(CP)	indicating	that	Casino	Rama	realized	a	$1.5	
billion	profit	on	roughly	$5.5	billion	in	revenues	from	1996-2010,	which	amounted	to	a	27.3%	profit	margin	(see	Perkel,	
2011).	The	yearly	figures	provided	are	based	on	this	percentage.	These	totals	do	not	include	the	slots	revenue	generated	at	
the	Lake	Scugog	charity	casino,	which,	during	this	period,	produced	on	average	roughly	$4.6	million	annually.	
generating	power:	in	terms	of	gross	revenues	generated	Ontario	at	$1.39	billion,	
outpaces	Alberta	and	Saskatchewan,	which	produced	similar	gross	annual	revenues	
($773	to	$725	million).	
Table	2
Gross Revenues, 2006-2011
2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 Total
Ontario $515,000,000 $499,000,000 $488,000,000 $467,500,000 $434,965,000 $2,404,465,000
Saskatchewan $130,337,810 $190,965,435 $226,765,170 $238,746,929 $259,821,502 $1,046,636,846
Alberta $33,745,555 $141,022,473 $253,835,015 $262,086,233 $257,050,973 $947,740,248
These	revenue	figures	are	a	good	starting	point	but	do	not	provide	a	definitive	
picture.	Measuring	the	net	revenues	generated	in	each	province	offers	a	better	
assessment.	For	instance,	between	2006	and	2011	Ontario	generated	the	highest	level	of	
net	revenues	followed	by	Alberta	and	Saskatchewan.	When	we	factor	in	the	anticipated	
annual	revenue	production	reflective	of	the	last	three	years	of	full	functionality	in	
Alberta	the	latter	closes	the	gap	earning	$309	million	compared	to	Ontario	at	roughly	
$380	million	and	Saskatchewan	at	more	than	$207	million.	
Table	3
Net Revenue, 2006-2011
2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 Total
Ontario1 $140,595,000 $136,227,000 $133,224,000 $127,627,500 $118,745,445 $656,418,945
Saskatchewan $48,836,918 $61,106,749 $67,220,171 $60,240,739 $64,094,171 $301,498,748
Alberta $13,498,222 $56,408,989 $101,534,006 $104,834,493 $102,820,389 $379,096,099
It	is	apparent	that	each	provincial	First	Nations	casino	industry	has	generally	
achieved	a	revenue	plateau.	As	Table	3	demonstrates	after	four	consecutive	years	of	
rising	net	revenues	Alberta	experienced	a	1.9%	drop	in	net	revenue	in	2010-2011.	
While	Saskatchewan	rebounded	by	6.4%	after	experiencing	its	first	drop	in	net	revenues	
following	several	consecutive	years	of	growth.	Ontario	has	witnessed	a	steady	15.5%	
decline	during	the	study	period.	These	general	outcomes	tend	to	echo	each	province’s	
economic	trends	during	the	study	period.	For	example,	simultaneous	to	Alberta’s	
economic	expansion	Ontario	experienced	a	decline	as	Saskatchewan	generally	
maintained	economic	equilibrium	(substantial	provincial	economic	growth	began	in	
2011).	This	levelling	off	and	drop	in	gross	revenues	in	the	two	largest	jurisdictions	may	
also	point	to	drops	in	gambling	participation	rates	due	to	exposure	(e.g.,	Shaffer,	LaBrie,	
&	LaPlante,	2004).	Evidence	from	Alberta	demonstrated	that	with	time	gambling	
participation	rates	drop	because	the	novelty	has	worn	off,	and	due	to	population	
familiarity	with	the	product	(Williams,	Belanger,	et	al.,	2011).	
In	terms	of	absolute	revenue	generating	clout	Ontario	substantially	outpaces	both	
Alberta	and	Saskatchewan.	Things	change,	however,	when	we	measure	the	net	revenues	
generated	in	each	province:	Ontario	just	slightly	outpaces	Alberta	in	this	regard	while	
drastically	outperforming	Saskatchewan.	For	now	we	can	basically	conclude	that	the	
Saskatchewan	approach	reliant	on	a	operating	a	number	of	smaller	to	middling	sized	
casinos	is	the	least	economically	successful	model.	
Community Revenue Allocations
	 In	each	case	the	provinces	agreed	to	negotiate	First	Nations	casinos	into	existence	for	
the	purposes	of	offsetting	socio-economic	difficulties	confronting	all	reserve	communities.	
It	is	consequently	incumbent	to	determine	the	First	Nations’	casinos	general	impact	by	
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assessing	the	average	amount	of	revenue	assigned	to	the	benefactor	communities,	and	
how	this	revenue	is	generally	being	utilized.	According	to	the	2006	Canada	Census,	which	
occurred	at	the	beginning	of	the	study	period,	there	were	133	First	Nations	in	Ontario,	70	in	
Saskatchewan	and	45	in	Alberta.	Each	of	these	communities	is	included	in	their	respective	
provincial-First	Nations	revenue-sharing	agreement.	Reflecting	on	the	last	three	years	of	
the	study	period	(dating	to	2008),	Alberta	directed	an	annual	average	of	$2.34	million	to	the	
provincial	First	Nations	followed	by	Ontario	($951,371)	and	Saskatchewan	($912,167).
Figure 2.	Per	Community	Casino	Revenue,	2008-2011
Consequently,	it	would	appear	that	the	Alberta	First	Nations	are	benefitting	more	than	
their	Saskatchewan	and	Ontario	counterparts.	Relying	exclusively	on	these	averages	is	not	
recommended,	for	according	to	each	provincial-First	Nations	revenue	sharing	agreement	
individual	First	Nations	communities	are	privy	to	a	pre-determined	level	of	revenue	based	on	
a	varied	set	of	factors	that	include	community	population	size,	their	geographic	placement,	
whether	or	not	it	is	considered	a	host	operation,	and	the	total	number	of	provincial	First	
Nations,	to	identify	four	elements.	As	a	result,	not	every	First	Nations	is	entitled	to	an	
equal	share	of	casino	revenues.	When	we	compare	Saskatchewan	and	Alberta,	as	outlined	
in	Table	4,	it	appears	the	former	ensure	a	more	equitable	distribution	of	funds.	Unlike	
Alberta’s	revenue	distribution	model	that	privileges	southern	over	northern	First	Nations,	
Saskatchewan	parcels	out	its	casino	revenues	more	equitably	(comparable	data	was	not	
available	from	Ontario)	(Belanger	et	al.,	2012).	Part	of	the	reason	for	this	disparity	has	to	do	
with	the	fact	that	Alberta	First	Nations	hosting	casinos	(two	are	located	in	the	south	and	three	
are	located	in	the	central	region)	are	entitled	to	a	higher	proportion	of	revenues	generated.	
Alberta	has	developed	First	Nations	policies	that	manufacture	regional	economic	disparity	by	
privileging	some	First	Nations	over	others	(Belanger,	Williams,	&	Arthur,	2012b).
Table	4
Regional Revenue Variance, Alberta & Saskatchewan, 2006-2010
2006-
2007
2007-
2008
2008-
2009
2009-
2010
Overall
North AB 28.9% 11.3% 7.9% 7.4% 8.4%
SK 37.2% 38% 37.5% 37.5% 37.6%
Central AB 49.8% 75.8% 21.1% 21.4% 30.3%
SK 31.4% 31.8% 31.4% 31.2% 31.5%
South AB 21.3% 13% 71% 71.3% 61.3%
SK 31.5% 30.2% 31.1% 31.2% 31%
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A	quick	word	on	regional	variance	is	required	for	Northern	First	Nations	
communities	in	each	of	the	three	provinces	experience	unique	challenges.	They	tend	
to	be	isolated	communities	(i.e.,	fly-in,	non-paved	logging	roads,	require	winter	
roads),	which	invariably	increase	the	local	cost	of	living,	as	all	materials	have	to	be	
flown	or	trucked	in	over	long	distances.	Community	infrastructure	frequently	pales	in	
comparison	to	southern	First	Nations.	Health	care	expenditures	are	higher	due	to	the	
cost	of	housing	health	professionals	in	these	isolated	communities,	and	for	traveling	
to	obtain	health	care	in	the	south.	The	diversified	nature	of	the	central	and	southern	
economies	enables	those	First	Nations	the	opportunity	to	engage	in	a	wider	variety	of	
business	opportunities.	Not	so	in	the	north.	Although	northern	living	is	more	expensive,	
in	Alberta,	for	example,	the	FNDF	is	not	adjusted	to	offset	community	differences	in	
cost	of	living	and	travel,	meaning	that	northern	populations	are	getting	less	value	for	
their	dollar.	As	is	evident	the	Saskatchewan	revenue	distribution	model	ensures	more	
equitable	distribution	overall	while	slightly	privileging	the	northern	communities.4 
	 As	for	per	capita	revenue	allocations,	Figure	3	shows	Alberta	leads	the	pack.	
Measuring	per	capita	distributions	is	necessary	as	this	aligns	with	how	Aboriginal	and	
Northern	Affairs	Canada	(AANAC)5	develops	its	funding	protocols	for	each	First	Nation	
in	Canada.6	It	also	offers	a	sense	of	how	much	money	is	being	generated	and	directed	to	
each	individual	despite	the	fact	that	per	capita	payments	are	not	permitted.	The	tracked	
revenues	are	assigned	to	an	assortment	of	programs	offered	in	each	community,	such	as	
pre-school,	construction,	or	growing	local	entrepreneurship,	and	as	such	perhaps	more	
reflective	of	the	First	Nations	casinos’	community	impacts.	In	this	regard	Ontario	has	
the	largest	First	Nations	population	with	178,309	followed	by	Saskatchewan	(129,138)	
and	Alberta	(94,422).	This	necessarily	alters	the	scope	of	the	casinos’	provincial	impacts	
as	Figure	3	illustrates.	Here	Alberta	directs	the	most	money	per	capita	at	$1,097	per	
individual	followed	by	Ontario	($780)	and	Saskatchewan	($430).	
Figure 3.	1000	Per	Capita	Casino	Revenue,	2008-2011
The	casino	revenues	represent	additional	funds	that	are	directed	to	local	First	
Nations	programs	and	the	creation	of	infrastructure.	As	Table	5	shows,	gaming	revenues	
4	 	A	review	of	the	available	data	suggests	that	Ontario	will	reflect	general	Saskatchewan	trends.	
5	 	Indian	and	Northern	Affairs	Canada	(INAC)	was	renamed	Aboriginal	and	Northern	Affairs	Canada	(AANDC)	to	“better	
reflect	the	scope	of	the	Minister’s	responsibilities	with	respect	to	First	Nations,	Inuit	and	Métis.	It	is	also	in	keeping	with	
practices	of	the	department	as,	in	recent	years,	the	responsibilities	of	the	department	have	expanded	to	include	and	better	
serve	First	Nations,	Métis	and	Inuit	peoples.”
6	 	Because	there	is	no	stipulation	about	what	percentage	of	AANDC	funding	that	bands	should	provide	to	off-reserve	
residents,	in	most	cases	these	monies	are	spent	exclusively	on	reserves	to	the	detriment	of	off-reserve	members.
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Saskatchewan revenue distribution model ensures more equitable distribution overall while 
slightly p vileging the northern communities.5  
 As for per c pita revenue allocat ons, Figure 3 shows Alberta leads the pack. Measuring 
per capita distributions is ecessary s this aligns with ho  riginal and Northern Affairs 
Canada (AANAC)6 develops its funding protocols for each First Nation in Canada.7 It also offers 
a sense of how much money is being generated and directed to each individual despite the fact 
that per capita payments are not permitted. The tracked revenues are assigned to an assortment of 
programs offered in each community, such as pre-school, construction, or growing local 
entrepreneurship, and as such perhaps more reflective of the First Nations casinos’ community 
impacts. In this regard Ontario has the largest First Nations population with 178,309 followed by 
Saskatchewan (129,138) and Alberta (94,422). This necessarily alters the scope of the casinos’ 
provincial impacts as Figure 3 illustrates. Here Alberta directs the most money per capita at 
$1,097 per individual followed by Ontario ($780) and Saskatchewan ($430).  
 
 
Figure 3. 1000 Per Capita Casino Revenue, 2008-2011 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A r view of the available data sugges s th t O tario will reflect g neral Saskatchewan trends.  
6 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) was renamed Aboriginal and North rn Affairs Canada (AANDC) to 
“better reflect the scope of the Minister's responsibilities with respect to First Nations, Inuit and Métis. It is also in 
keeping with practices of the departm t as, in ecent yea s, the responsibilities of the d partment have expanded to 
include and better serve First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples.” 
7 B cause there is no stipulation about what percentage of AANDC funding that bands should provide to off-reserve 
residents, in most cases these monies are spent exclusively on reserves to the detriment of off-reserve members. 
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supplement	provincial	First	Nations	budgets	by	an	average	of	12.23%	led	by	Ontario	
at	17.2%,	followed	by	Alberta	(11.67%),	then	Saskatchewan	(3.84%).	The	revenues	
in	questions	are	directed	to	the	communities	in	the	form	of	social	programs,	economic	
development	projects,	and	infrastructure	development	and	enhancement.	The	variances	
in	the	per	capita	percentage	of	revenues	received	is	a	product	of	net	revenues	identified	
below	in	Table	5	in	relation	to	the	provincial	First	Nations	populations—federal	funding	
formulas,	while	not	universal	or	static,	are	nevertheless	similar	for	each	community.	
Table	5
Casino Contributions to Host First Nations as a Percentage Above Federal Payments
Federal 
Contribution
Casino/
Gambling 
Revenues
Gambling Revenue 
as % of Federal 
Contribution
Ontario
Totals (2006-2011) $3,816,351,659 $656,418,945 17.2%
Yearly Average $763,270,332 $131,283,789 17.2%
Saskatchewan
Totals (2003-2008)2 $2,046,850,503 $78,546,267 3.84%
Yearly Average $409,370,101 $15,709,253 3.84%
Alberta
Totals (2006-2011) $3,212,438,900 $374,867,594 11.67%
Yearly Average $642,487,780 $74,973,519 11.67%
Totals (average) $605,042,738 $73,988,854 12.23%
The	provincial-First	Nations	funding	formulas	in	Ontario	and	Alberta	have	come	under	
fire	due	to	several	evident	inequities.	In	Ontario,	the	Mnjikaning	First	Nations	was	initially	
entitled	to	keep	35%	of	CasinoRama’s	profits	for	hosting	the	casino.	This	led	to	a	lawsuit	
filed	by	the	Ontario	First	Nation	chiefs	seeking	more	equitable	distribution.	The	35%	was	
held	in	trust	until	2008,	when	the	chiefs	agreed	to	forsake	their	rights	to	the	35%	revenues	
in	exchange	for	$201	million	and	a	1.7%	cut	of	Ontario	provincial	gaming	revenues.	The	
deal	is	expected	to	provide	the	133	First	Nations	$120	million	annually,	which	doubled	
their	current	take	under	the	original	agreement	(Canadian	Press,	2010).	In	Alberta,	
Enoch’s	FNDF	disbursement	of	$35	million	in	2008/2009	was	303%	more	than	its	INAC’s	
budgetary	allocation.	Similarly	Tsuu	T’ina	received	more	than	$28	million,	which	was	142%	
more	than	its	INAC	budget.	Despite	lower	than	expected	returns,	gambling	revenues	also	
contribute	noticeably	to	two	other	host	First	Nations’—Alexis	Nakota	Sioux	Nation	and	the	
Cold	Lake	First	Nations—overall	budgets.	FNDF	funding	in	total	represented	83.3%	of	the	
4	communities’	collective	allocation.	Not	surprisingly,	the	percentage	of	revenue	accounted	
for	by	the	FNDF	was	much	less	for	non-host	communities	(Belanger	&	Williams,	2012a).	
The	host	community	benefits	in	Saskatchewan	are	confined	to	wages	plus	benefits	earned	
by	the	Aboriginal	employees	that	make	up	65%	of	the	SIGA	workforce;	and	in	the	form	of	
external	discretionary	spending	by	gamblers	visiting	the	First	Nations.	
Problem Gambling & Crime
Concerns	have	frequently	been	raised	concerning	the	negative	impact	of	introducing	
casinos	to	First	Nations	communities,	the	most	common	being	the	anticipated	rise	in	
problem	and	pathological	gambling.	Writing	in	2011,	journalist	Tasha	Kheiriddin	stated	
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2	 	At	the	time	of	the	initial	analysis	for	this	paper	First	Nations	profiles	for	Saskatchewan	were	only	available	to	the	year	
2008.	
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that constructing	reserve	casinos	would	not	be	able	to	overcome	the	federal,	provincial	
and	First	Nation	political	inability	to	properly	respond	to	among	other	issues	health	
problems.	Existing	research	does	not	support	such	grandiloquent	claims.	In	Alberta,	
the	only	province	where	research	exists	exploring	the	impact	of	introducing	casinos	to	
First	Nations	communities	illustrates	that	in	three	of	the	four	communities	for	which	
data	are	available	the	difference	in	problem	and	pathological	gambling	rates	between	
2008	and	2009	were	not	statistically	significant	(Williams,	Belanger,	et	al.,	2011).	The	
number	of	problem	gamblers	at	the	Stoney	Nakoda	Nation	did	increase	by	a	factor	of	
3.8	from	2008	to	2009.	Consistent	with	earlier	research,	First	Nation	prevalence	rates	
are	notably	and	consistently	higher	than	the	general	population	prevalence	rates	across	
Alberta	(Wardman,	el-Guebaly,	&	Hodgins,	2001;	Williams,	Stevens,	&	Nixon,	2011).	Yet	
there	is	some	evidence	of	decreased	rates	of	First	Nations	problem	gambling	since	2000,	
coincident	with	the	same	trend	that	may	be	occurring	in	the	general	population	(Williams,	
Belanger,	et	al.,	2011).	This	despite	significant	increases	in	gambling	availability	and	
general	population	per	capita	expenditure	during	this	time	period.	Once	again	we	can	
point	to	drops	in	gambling	participation	rates	due	to	exposure	(e.g.,	Shaffer,	LaBrie,	&	
LaPlante,	2004)	because	the	novelty	has	worn	off	(Williams,	Belanger,	et	al.,	2011).	It	is	
duly	noted	that	these	rates	reflect	Aboriginal	population	trends	across	Alberta,	rather	than	
Aboriginal	populations	in	the	immediate	proximity	of	the	five	new	First	Nations	casinos.	
Clearly	additional	work	is	needed,	but	findings	to	date	do	not	support	Kheiriddin’s	dire	
predictions.	
The	same	can	be	said	for	casino-related	crime	rates,	where	once	again	our	
understanding	of	the	trends	is	restricted	to	Alberta.	With	the	exception	of	the	Enoch	
First	Nation,	none	of	Alberta’s	host	First	Nations	or	community	officials	could	confirm	a	
post-casino	increase	in	crime	(see	also	Arthur,	Williams,	&	Belanger,	2014).	The	highest	
profile	criminal	activity	occurred	following	the	River	Cree	Casino	and	Resort’s	opening,	
where	Native	as	well	as	Jamaican	and	Asian	gangs	from	Edmonton	were	vying	for	both	
on-	and	off-reserve	territorial	control.	The	River	Cree	Casino	Club	also	served	alcohol	
drawing	younger	patrons,	and	the	Royal	Canadian	Mounted	Police	(RCMP)	frequently	
responded	to	service	calls	that	were	assault-	and	alcohol-related.	Of	all	the	issues	
identified	by	the	police,	government	officials	and	casino	operators	money	laundering	
is	considered	to	be	the	most	problematic.	According	to	RCMP	officials,	various	gangs	
purchase	chips	with	high	value	bills.	After	gambling	minimally	for	a	half	hour,	they	cash	
the	chips,	thus	effectively	laundering	the	money.	An	8-member	RCMP	squad	responsible	
for	providing	casino	and	reserve	policing	has	worked	closely	with	the	Enoch	Cree	Nation	
to	mitigate	local	criminal	activity.	Crime	rates	are	now	down	due	to	an	enhanced	RCMP	
presence	on	reserve.	An	RCMP	official	responsible	for	patrolling	the	Stoney	casino	
reported	that	the	minimal	casino	calls	(accounting	for	only	25%	of	each	officer’s	time),	
enables	officers	to	devote	additional	resources	to	combating	the	local	drug	trade,	domestic	
abuse,	assaults,	and	mischief.	Enhanced	policing	at	Stoney	has	also	led	to	greater	police-
community	relations	(Williams,	Belanger,	et	al.,	2011).
Employment and Income
First	Nations	leaders	in	each	province	early	on	extolled	the	virtues	of	reserve	casinos,	
potential	employment	being	the	most	significant.	In	short,	casinos	would	both	produce	
revenues	for	distribution	to	all	provincial	First	Nations	and	Aboriginal	individuals	would	
be	employed.	In	1995,	Casino	Rama	Project	chairman	Ted	Williams	predicted	the	casino	
would	generate	between	upwards	of	$400	million	a	year	and	employ	1,300	people	
(Walker,	1995,	p.	B2),	a	number	that	one	month	later	had	jumped	to	2,200	employees.	
When	the	doors	opened	in	July	1996	the	workforce	stood	at	2,600	roughly	620	of	which	
were	Aboriginal	(Ferguson,	1996,	p.	A4).	Those	numbers	remained	relatively	stable	
through	1999,	when	it	was	reported	that	Casino	Rama	employed	487	people	from	55	
provincial	First	Nations,	which	made	up	20%	of	the	workforce	(Marowits,	1999,	p.	A4),	a	
total	that	peaked	in	2003	at	750	Aboriginal	employees.	As	of	2011	CasinoRama	employed	
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450	Aboriginal	people,	which	at	the	time	represented	14.8%	(3,040)	of	the	casino	
workforce.	Using	$30,000	per	employee	as	the	average	wage	we	estimate	that	roughly	
$22.5	million	is	earned	by	Aboriginal	employees.	In	Alberta	original	estimates	suggested	
that	the	five	First	Nations	casinos	would	employ	1,340	people	with	an	annual	payroll	of	
$37.8	million	while	acknowledging	that	a	shortage	of	casino	professionals	and	a	limited	
Aboriginal	labor	pool	would	require	that	non-Native	employees	also	be	hired.	In	fiscal	
2009/2010	the	five	First	Nations’	casinos	had	a	total	1,030	employees	and	the	total	
number	of	employees	and	total	payroll	fell	below	initial	expectations.	In	total,	current	
employee	numbers	represents	78%	of	initial	projections,	whereas	the	$31,025,000	
payroll	represents	82%	of	original	projections.	A	significant	percentage	of	the	five	First	
Nation	casino	charities	employ	First	Nations	people.	Out	of	the	approximately	170	
employees,	90%	(155)	are	believed	to	be	First	Nations	with	a	total	estimated	payroll	
$3.4	million,	with	the	First	Nations	themselves	retaining	$3.1	million	of	these	wages	
(Williams,	Belanger,	et	al.,	2011).	Saskatchewan	by	far	has	made	the	most	impressive	
strides	as	concerns	casino	Aboriginal	employment	where	roughly	1,200	Aboriginal	
employees	make	up	64%	of	the	workforce	and	in	2010	generated	more	than	$51	million	
in	Aboriginal	wages	plus	benefits.	
Table	6
First Nations Casino Aboriginal Employees/Wages + Benefits
Number	of	
Employees,	
2010
Aboriginal	
Employees,	
2010
Annual	Gross	
Aboriginal	
Wages	+	
Benefits	in	
2010
Gross	
Aboriginal	
Wages	+	
Benefits,	
2006-2011
Ontario 5,068 750 $22,500,000
Saskatchewan 1,900 1,235 $51,438,609
Alberta 1,030 206 $6,205,000 n/a
Table	6	demonstrates	the	cumulative	effect	of	these	wages.	A	review	of	the	SIGA’s	
annual	reports,	for	instance,	demonstrates	that	between	2006	and	2011	Aboriginal	
employees	earned	$208,256,563	of	the	$320,800,014	paid	out	in	total	wages	and	benefits,	
which	amounts	to	roughly	65%.	During	the	same	period	CasinoRama’s	Aboriginal	
employees	earned	$137,250,000	(data	was	not	available	for	Alberta).	While	not	all	of	
these	dollars	remain	in	Aboriginal	communities	they	do	represent	value	added	when	
factoring	in	the	casino	revenues	that	enter	the	community	in	the	form	of	programs	and	
added	infrastructure.	Measuring	the	impact	of	wages	versus	infrastructure	and	program	
investment	is	difficult.	Whereas	wages	would	have	better	immediate	impact	because	
they	would	quickly	be	spent	on	products	and	services	(albeit	from	outside	of	Aboriginal	
communities	boasting	limited	infrastructure	and	localized	business)	ultimately	this	
money	is	lost	to	the	local	economy.	Creating	infrastructure	that	would	enhance	local	
spending	would	have	better	long-term	value	in	terms	of	helping	to	establish	community	
equilibrium	from	social,	political	and	economic	perspectives.	We	can	conclude	that	if 
you	are	looking	to	build	an	economy	from	the	ground	up,	which	is	the	case	for	many	of	
the	First	Nations	gaming	beneficiaries,	public	investments	are	the	most	effective	means.	
The	impact	of	personal	spending	power	cannot	however	be	understated.	
Of	note,	employment	figures	for	each	First	Nations	community	in	each	province	
are	not	available,	making	it	impossible	to	determine	how	casino	openings	affected	local	
employment	trends.	Statistics	Canada	and	Indian	and	Northern	Affairs	Canada	(INAC)	
utilize	Canadian	census	data,	the	latest	year	being	2011.	Hindering	our	analysis	is	the	fact	
that	many	First	Nations	in	this	study	cite	an	inherent	right	to	self-government	to	restrict	
Canadian	surveyors	from	entering	their	communities.	Thus	their	online	community	
profiles	lack	vital	data	for	employment,	annual	earnings,	work	force	characteristics,	
$137,250,000
$208,256,563
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or	even	gender	and	age.	Considering	that	we	are	unable	to	generate	data	sets	for	some	
of	the	larger	gaming	First	Nations	(Enoch	and	Tsuu	T’ina	in	Alberta	among	them),	and	
benefit	significantly	from	the	projects,	the	lack	of	complete	(or	any)	data	sets	hinders	our	
analysis.	The	above	discussion	at	the	very	least	provides	the	baseline	data	from	which	
future	analyses	may	be	developed.
Provincial Benefits
The	most	contentious	element	of	the	provincial-First	Nations	gaming	agreements	is	
the	provision	directing	a	portion	of	revenues	earned	in	First	Nations	casinos	to	provincial	
treasuries.	But	what	are	the	overall	costs	to	the	First	Nations	benefitting	from	a	process	
presumably	intended	to	provide	communities	with	what	Alberta	officials	described	as	the	
“means	to	support	economic,	social	and	community	development	projects	as	well	as	use	
charitable	gaming	proceeds	for	initiatives	such	as	infrastructure	and	life	skills	training”?	
Table	7	shows	that	during	the	study	period	30%	of	Alberta	and	25%	of	Saskatchewan	
First	Nations	net	gaming	revenues	were	directed	to	their	respective	provincial	
governments.7	Ontario	adopted	a	different	strategy	by	applying	a	20%	WinTax	on	
CasinoRama’s	gross	revenues.	On	average	the	Ontario	government	takes	in	$96,178,600,	
Alberta	$56,864,415	(since	all	First	Nations	casinos	became	operational	this	total	has	
risen	to	$77	million	annually)	and	Saskatchewan	$5,441,410.	
Table	7
Provincial Fees Drawn from First Nations Gaming Revenues8
2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 Total
Ontario $103,000,000 $99,800,000 $97,600,000 $93,500,000 $86,993,000 $480,893,000
Saskatchewan $10,210,094 $5,252,187 $4,105,043 $2,368,185 $5,271,543 $27,207,052
Alberta $10,123,667 $42,306,742 $76,150,505 $78,625,870 $77,115,292 $284,322,074
In	all	during	the	study	period	roughly	$.75	billion	was	diverted	from	First	Nations	
development	and	into	provincial	coffers	where	the	money	has	been	used	for	provincial	
development.	First	Nations	casinos	are	in	part	driving	provincial	development—especially	
in	Ontario	and	Alberta—despite	the	fact	that	First	Nations	casinos	were	touted	as	means	
to	aid	First	Nations	development.	It	would	appear	therefore	that	First	Nations	casinos	
benefit	Alberta	and	Ontario’s	non-Native	provincial	citizens	notably.	Improvement	in	this	
case	is,	of	course,	also	dependent	on	Alberta	releasing	FNDF	revenues,	which	are	held	in	
trust	until	a	First	Nation	satisfies	provincial	administrators’	spending	practices	guidelines;	
and	Ontario	releasing	money	withheld	until	resolution	of	the	several	lawsuits	involving	
CasinoRama.	Notably	all	three	provinces	release	gaming	revenues	only	once	it	has	been	
determined	that	they	are	to	be	spent	according	to	provincially	prescribed	guidelines	
intended	to	assist	administrators	in	determining	what	is	considered	to	be	an	appropriate	
development	venture.	During	the	study	period	Alberta	held	back	13%	of	all	charity	
monies	and	a	portion	of	FNDF	funds,	amounting	to	more	than	$13	million.	These	strict	
spending	provisions	dictate	that	provincial	regulators	are	depriving	First	Nations	from	
accessing	revenue	generated	in	First	Nations	casinos.	Notably	the	provincial	allocation	
provides	each	province	a	safety	net	for	reclaiming	a	portion	of	the	gambling	revenues	
leaking	from	the	provincial	economy	vis-à-vis	non-Native	gamblers	into	the	micro	First	
Nations	economy.
Conclusions
The	above	discussion	contends	that	each	provincial	First	Nations	gaming	model	has	
positive	and	negative	elements	and	offers	a	series	of	important	findings.	Perhaps	the	most	
significant	is	that	First	Nations	casinos	are	not	performing	to	maximum	benefit,	at	least	
as	far	as	leaders	of	benefactor	First	Nations	communities	would	recognize.	Apart	from	
7	 	In	2007,	the	Saskatchewan	government	lowered	its	take	of	First	Nations	gaming	revenues	from	37.5%	to	25%	while	raising	
the	First	Nations	take	of	profits	to	75%.
8	 	The	Saskatchewan	data	reflects	the	change	in	the	provincial	take	on	revenues	between	2007-2008.	
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Saskatchewan’s	notable	employment	trends	and	the	fact	that	no	discernable	post-casino	
increases	in	problem	gambling	or	casino-related	crime	are	evident	in	the	provincial	First	
Nations	communities;	or	among	its	Aboriginal	populations,	two	policy	issues	continue	
to	hinder	the	First	Nation	gaming	industry’s	economic	potential.	First,	although	each	
province	developed	unique	approaches	to	forging	its	specific	gaming	policy,	each	one	
included	a	similar	and	key	provision:	they	all	opted	to	divert	substantial	gaming	revenues	
into	their	own	treasuries	and	away	from	struggling	First	Nations	communities.	In	total,	
the	First	Nations	in	the	three	provinces	during	the	study	period	were	deprived	of	roughly	
three-quarters	of	a	billion	dollars	in	gaming	revenues	that	could	have	been	directed	to	
local	development	and	poverty	reduction	schemes.	This	exposes	the	reality	that	First	
Nations	casinos	are	prominently	benefiting	non-Aboriginal	provincial	citizens,	which	
challenges	the	spirit	and	intent	of	the	provincial	First	Nations	gaming	policies.	
The	second	policy-related	issue	concerns	casino	site	prescriptions.	In	Ontario	the	
NDP	government	insisted	that	one	central,	reserve-based	casino	service	all	provincial	
First	Nations.	Alberta	and	Saskatchewan	adopted	a	dissimilar	approach	that	permitted	
multiple	First	Nations	casino	operations	so	long	as	they	were	constructed	on	a	reserve.	
This	did	and	continues	to	inform	economic	outcomes	in	each	province.	In	addition	
to	influencing	employment	trends,	among	other	issues,	the	larger	gaming	properties	
located	nearby	a	significant	market	provide	greater	benefits	compared	to	the	smaller	
casino	properties	sited	in	more	isolated	areas.	Whereas	in	Saskatchewan	the	First	
Nations	gaming	industry	model	is	characterized	by	smaller,	isolated	First	Nations	
casino	properties,	Alberta	chose	to	blend	the	latter	with	the	use	of	large	and	centralized	
casinos	located	near	a	significant	market	(see,	for	e.g.,	Eadington	&	Collins,	2009).	In	
Ontario,	the	First	Nation	casino	was	located	in	an	adequate	market	and	has	performed	
admirably	even	if	the	move	did	confine	the	industry	to	the	provincial	south-west	while	
also	forestalling	attempts	at	industry	expansion.	Similar	site	prescriptions	considerably	
compromised	nine	of	the	11	prairie	casinos	profitability,	consequently	undermining	
struggling	provincial	First	Nations	who	envisioned	gaming	revenues	as	a	means	to	
facilitate	community	development.	
The	policy	deficiencies	that	continue	to	undercut	the	First	Nations	gaming	industry’s	
economic	promise	have	resulted	in	a	unique	outcome	that	demands	unpacking	for	
the	benefit	of	First	Nations	seeking	market	entry,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	the	provincial	
officials	assigned	the	responsibility	for	creating	and	implementing	(equitable)	First	
Nations	gaming	policies.	As	the	analysis	loosely	revealed,	the	destination	integrated	
resort	has	proven	more	lucrative	in	Alberta	and	Ontario,	the	latter	of	which	offers	what	
appears	to	be	a	solid	balance	of	development	and	employment	potential.	Ostensibly	one	
could	argue	that	these	discrepancies	are	attributable	to	the	acknowledged	differences	
between	the	repeater	market	and	the	destination	integrated	resort	models	(Eadington	
&	Collins,	2009).	We	cannot	however	conclusively	trace	the	provincial	gaming	policy	
variances	to	any	formal	discussion	about	these	models’	characteristics	for	these	
conversations	did	not	occur.	Hence	the	provincial	approaches	to	policy	making	were	in	
no	way	informed,	and	as	such	could	not	take	into	consideration	these	nuanced	policy	
debates.	Until	such	time	that	additional	research	is	produced	specifically	examining	these	
and	like	trends	our	ability	to	identify	a	best	practice	remains	limited.	
To	be	certain	First	Nations	casinos	appear	to	be	working	well	albeit	within	the	scope	
of	provincial	policy	prescriptions	that	have	unduly	restricted	the	industry’s	participants,	
which	in	turn	has	negatively	influenced	First	Nations	casinos’	economic	development	
potential.	Further	work	exploring	these	impacts	is	warranted,	as	is	provincial	
reconsideration	of	the	need	to	seize	casino	revenues	for	its	own	development	purposes—
they	should	be	redirected	back	into	First	Nations’	development,	minus	regulatory	costs,	
as	the	policy	initially	intended.	
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